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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
litigation was chargeable with knowledge of the dispute. The purpose
of the rule was to prevent any conveyance of the disputed property
during the pendency of the action which would destroy the value of
a judgment in favor of the plaintiff.153 In a similar manner, article
65 of the CPLR requires that a notice of pendency be filed in any
action which would affect the title, possession, use or enjoyment of
real property before constructive notice of the litigation is attributed
to a purchaser or encumbrancer.
CPLR 6515 enables a defendant to cancel the notice of pen-
dency.' 4 Such cancellation will release the property from the con-
structive notice effect of article 65 and allow the defendant to deal
freely with it during the proceedings. 55 In order to obtain such a
cancellation, the defendant must appeal to the court's discretion and
give an adequate undertaking to secure the plaintiff.
John H. Dair Building Construction Co. v. Mayer 56 affords an
example of the foregoing procedure. Plaintiff instituted an action to
recover monies alleged to have been wrongfully taken by one defen-
dant and used for the purchase of the real estate which was the subject
of the notice of pendency. The lower court granted defendants' motion
to cancel the notice of pendency on the condition that defendants file
a surety undertaking in the amount of $31,500. The defendants
complied with the order, settled a mechanic's lien on the property, and
sold it for an amount in excess of $41,000. The appellate division
modified the order by requiring a surety bond in the amount of
$42,000 on the grounds that the bond would serve as a substitute for
the property, and plaintiff, if successful, should be entitled to an
amount equal to the net proceeds realizable after a bona fide sale of
the property.
ARTICLE 75- AnRMATION
CPLR 7501: Court refuses to enforce inadequate arbitration agree-
ment in child custody dispute.
It has been suggested that under CPLR 7501 a court is primarily
concerned with three questions in determining whether or not to
153 7A WEINSrEN, KoRN & MILLER, Nmv YoRK CiL PRAcrcE 6501.01 (1968). For
a discussion of the doctrine of lis pendens, see Halley v. Ano, 136 N.Y. 569, 32 N.E. 1068
(1893).
154 It should be noted that not only the defendant but any "person aggrieved" can
secure cancellation of a notice of pendency. The movant must have an interest in the realty
that will be adversely affected by the judgment. See generally 7A WEINSrEIN, KoaN &
MmLER, NEw YoRK Cnvm P RAarc". 6515.06 (1968).
155 However, CPLR 6515 does not apply in three instances: (I) an action to foreclose
a mortgage; (2) an action for partition; and (3) an action for dower.
158 31 App. Div. 2d 835, 298 N.Y.S.2d 122 (2d Dep't 1969).
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compel arbitration: (1) have the parties made an agreement to arbi-
trate? (2) has a dispute arisen? and (3) has there been a refusal to
arbitrate?157 Agreements between husbands and wives, like other con-
tractual agreements, fall within the realm of 7501. However, the courts
have never felt compelled to send all types of family disputes to arbi-
tration, even where the parties have expressly provided for that rem-
edy.158
In Sheets v. Sheets,159 the court clarified the New York view on
"family arbitrations," noting that disputes between parents regarding
rights of visitation and custody of children were arbitrable as long
as the welfare and best interests of the child were not adversely af-
fected.160 Sheets recommended use of a two-stage procedure wherein the
issue of custody could initially be decided by arbitration, subject how-
ever to the supervisory power of the court.161
In Agur v. Agur,162 the Appellate Division, Second Department,
recently expressed "grave doubt whether such a two-stage procedure
would have wide application."'163 The court reasoned that arbitration
would not be compelled under CPLR 7501 where those nominated
as arbitrators were not fully qualified to review all matters relating to
the granting of custody, since such arbitrators would not serve the court
in "discharging its duties as parens patriae."'6 4 Because the arbitrators
in Agur (rabbis, well versed in Jewish religious law) had but limited
qualifications, their scope of concern in arbitration was not sufficiently
broad to satisfy the court.
The court realized that it must examine other factors beyond
those concerned with the child's religious faith. Recognizing the judi-
cial process to be "more broadly gauged and better suited" to award
custody,165 it pointed out that the lack of legal expertise in many
arbitrators led to the duplication of work once judicial review was
sought. Also noted were the "narrowly limited grounds" for review
157 See 8 WEINSTEIN, KoRN & MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACrIcE 7501.20 (1968).
158 Id. at 7501.16.
'59 22 App. Div. 2d 176, 254 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1st Dep't 1964). For a discussion of Sheets
v. Sheets see 33 Fo3DHAM L. REv. 726 (1965).
160 Sheets overturned Michelman v. Michelman, 5 Misc. 2d 570, 135 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1954) (dealing with visitation rights), and Hill v. Hill, 199 Misc. 1035, 104
N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1951) (concerned with non-arbitrability of both
custody and visitation disputes).
161 Historically, the state and its courts act as parens patriae, having the final re-
sponsibility governing the custody of infants. See Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E.
624 (1925).
162 32 App. Div. 2d 16, 298 N.YS.2d 772 (2d Dep't 1969).
163 Id. at 21, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
164 Id. at 22, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
165 Id, at 20, %98 N.Y.S.2d at 777.
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in such decisions, 66 and the effect upon the infant who must wait
through both an arbitration and a court proceeding, when the arbi-
tration may be of questionable value.
In short, Agur signifies the judiciary's reluctance to compel
arbitration in child custody disputes where it finds arbitration to be
a less than adequate solution. The value and desirability of arbitration
are for the court to determine in each situation, especially when it
is concerned with the more weighty problems of custody. If the arbi-
tration agreement of the parties is not an adequate remedy, the court
will not enforce it. However, the well-drafted document, which pro-
vides for a qualified, mutually acceptable panel of arbitrators, should
continue to be honored and enforced by the courts.
CPLR 7501: Consolidations of arbitrations permissible unless prej-
udice would thereby result.
In Met Food Corp. v. M. Eisenberg & Brothers, Inc.167 a general
contractor, The Heyward-Robinson Company, Inc. [hereinafter Hey-
ward], and an electrical contractor M. Eisenberg & Brothers, Inc. [here-
inafter Eisenberg], had each provided for arbitration clauses in their
separate construction contracts with Met Food Corporation [herein-
after Met]. Under the terms of the arbitration clauses, each party was
to appoint one arbitrator, with a third to be chosen by the two already
appointed. The agreements also contained a provision with respect
to Met's right to indemnification for any claims asserted against it by
one contractor for damages caused by any other contractor employed by
Met.
Eisenberg subsequently served a notice to arbitrate on Met. Pur-
suant to their agreements, each party appointed an arbitrator, and
a third member of the panel was duly chosen. However, Met then
sought to enjoin the arbitration pending the joinder of Heyward as
a party, asserting that it had subsequently learned that many of Eisen-
berg's claims were "predicated upon 'omissions and misdeeds' of Hey-
ward."168
The court reasoned that even under the CPA, pursuant to which
joinders and consolidations were unquestionably proper in light of
the fact that arbitration was then itself a special proceeding, consolida-
tion could not be ordered in a situation such as the present one. Unless
either Eisenberg or Heyward waived its right to participate in the
166 See CPLR 7511(b).
167 59 Misc. 2d 498, 299 N.Y.S.2d 696 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1969).
168 Id. at 500, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
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